Theology, Science, and Life

Carmody Grey, assistant professor of Catholic theology at Durham University, argues in her new book that a strong division between theology and science is unsustainable. She applies this idea in particular to the study of biology. In this post I will review and assess her argument in Theology, Science and Life.

In her first chapter, Grey presents a vision of theology as an all-encompassing intellectual framework that shapes our understanding of reality. She contrasts this with the modern perception of theology as merely another academic discipline. Grey challenges the modern idea of autonomous, secular reason by arguing that all reason is inherently theological, illuminated by the divine logos and rooted in the knowledge of God. She asserts that theology should not be compartmentalized but must inform and critique all areas of knowledge and existence, thereby challenging the so-called Enlightenment’s division between reason and faith.

A significant part of Grey’s metaphysical stance involves the idea of participation in God. She emphasizes that all creatures inherently participate in the divine, which denies any separation between the divine and the created order, both cognitively and ontologically. Grey blurs the line between transcendence and immanence, proposing that all human knowledge of God is mediated through creation, making theology relevant to every aspect of human enquiry.

Grey’s critique extends to other disciplines, particularly modern social theory, which claims to explain society purely in natural terms, thus marginalizing theology. She contends that no discipline can be neutral or autonomous from theological insight. She also criticizes modern theology’s “false humility,” where it accepts a secondary role to other disciplines. According to Grey, theology should position itself as a meta-discourse that critiques and qualifies other fields of knowledge.

This first chapter lays out a robust foundation for understanding Grey’s radical theological stance. Her critique of modern rationality and the compartmentalization of knowledge offers a compelling argument for the integration of theology into all areas of intellectual inquiry. By challenging readers to reconsider the boundaries between secular and sacred knowledge and the role of theology in contemporary discourse, the chapter effectively positions theology as an essential and overarching meta-discourse.

In her next chapter, Grey examines the concept of theological reason as an alternative to secular reason, emphasizing the narrative of Christianity which encompasses creation, redemption, and sanctification. Grey, through the lens of theologian John Milbank, explores how this narrative of peace is integral to theological reasoning and serves as the foundation for understanding differences peacefully, in contrast to secular rationality which often frames difference in terms of conflict.

Milbank’s argument centers on the idea that the Christian narrative is uniquely capable of mediating differences without resorting to violence, proposing that ultimate reality is fundamentally peaceful. This stands in opposition to secular perspectives that view difference through the lens of rivalry and conflict. He asserts that the Christian tradition is defensible precisely because it can envision a harmonious coexistence of differences, an idea rooted in the peaceful creation by God.

The chapter discusses the ontological significance of difference in Milbank’s thought, emphasizing that every individual is unique and that this uniqueness is valuable. Christian theology, according to Milbank, recognizes this ultimate difference as peaceful and non-conflictual. This theological perspective sees conflict as a secondary, privative intrusion rather than an inherent aspect of reality.

Milbank’s critique of secular reason is underscored by his assertion that secular reason’s inability to recognize an original peace leads to a worldview dominated by conflict and violence. In contrast, the Christian narrative of creatio ex nihilo (creation from nothing) underscores peace as essential and violence as an unnecessary deviation. This narrative provides a framework for understanding all existence as bookended by peace, from creation to eschatological fulfillment.

Grey further elaborates on how Milbank positions Christian theology as a “master discourse” not in terms of domination but in its unique ability to sustain peaceful difference. Theology, in this sense, is seen as a meta-narrative that can embrace all stories without reducing them to violent competition. This peaceful mastery aligns with the Christian belief in a harmonious creation and ultimate redemption.

Milbank contrasts the Christian perspective with that of Nietzsche, who views the beginning of all things as rooted in violence and the will to power. For Milbank, however, the beginning is marked by peace and gratuitous gift, with violence seen as a later corruption. This foundational peace, according to Milbank, is what enables the possibility of a truly peaceful society, as exemplified by the practices of the Christian church.

Despite the historical church’s failures to fully embody this peace, Milbank maintains that the church’s narrative and practices continue to offer a vision of a harmonious existence. The chapter concludes with an acknowledgment of the church’s shortcomings but emphasizes the ongoing relevance of its peaceful narrative.

I would like to pause for a moment and compare Grey with another work I recently reviewed here, Philip Goff’s Why?

Grey’s work in “theological reason” and Goff’s arguments in his exploration of panpsychism present two distinct yet thematically connected critiques of modern intellectual paradigms. Grey’s argument centers on the integration of theology into all aspects of intellectual inquiry, challenging the modern compartmentalization of secular and sacred knowledge. She contends that all reason is inherently theological, illuminated by the divine logos and rooted in the knowledge of God. Grey critiques modern rationality and the Enlightenment’s impact on theology, advocating for theology as a meta-discourse that critiques and informs other fields of knowledge. Her metaphysical stance involves the idea of participation in God, emphasizing that all creatures inherently partake in the divine, thus blurring the line between transcendence and immanence.

In contrast, Philip Goff’s work focuses on the integration of consciousness into our understanding of the physical world through the lens of panpsychism. Goff argues that consciousness is a fundamental and ubiquitous feature of the physical world, challenging both physicalist and dualist perspectives that fail to adequately explain consciousness. He posits that all matter has a mental aspect, thereby proposing panpsychism as a solution to the explanatory gap between physical processes and subjective experience. Goff’s philosophical critique centers on the inadequacies of traditional materialist views that consider consciousness merely an emergent property of complex physical systems.

The foundational concepts of Grey and Goff differ significantly. Despite these differences, both authors employ integrationist approaches. Grey integrates theology with reason, while Goff integrates consciousness with physical reality. This shared approach reflects a broader challenge to reductionist views in contemporary thought.

Grey’s epistemological approach uses a theological framework to critique modern rationality and secular reason. She argues that the Christian narrative of creation, redemption, and sanctification provides a framework for understanding and mediating differences peacefully, contrasting with the inherently conflictual nature of secular rationality. Goff’s epistemological approach, meanwhile, uses a philosophical framework to critique physicalist and dualist accounts of consciousness. Metaphysically, Grey assumes an inherent participation of all creatures in the divine, suggesting a seamless integration of the sacred and the secular. Goff assumes that consciousness is a fundamental aspect of matter. Both authors, through their respective metaphysical stances, offer critiques of modern paradigms that seek to reduce complex phenomena to simpler, more easily understood elements.

But it is Grey’s approach, deeply rooted in theological tradition, that offers a holistic integration of faith and reason. By advocating for the inclusion of theological reasoning in all areas of intellectual inquiry, she provides a framework that not only critiques modern secular rationality but also seeks to harmonize the sacred and the secular. Her emphasis on the inherent participation of all creatures in the divine and the peaceful mediation of differences through the Christian narrative offers a profound understanding of the interconnectedness of God, humanity, and the natural world. This perspective can be particularly enriching for those who value a theologically grounded worldview that transcends the limitations of purely secular rationality.

However, if your inclination is towards a comprehensive understanding that integrates spiritual, moral, and metaphysical dimensions, Grey’s theological framework is indeed more helpful. Her arguments not only address the limitations of modern rationality but also offer a vision of reality that is deeply interconnected and rooted in divine participation. This can provide a richer, more nuanced understanding of the relationship between God, humanity, and the natural world, aligning with a worldview that sees all aspects of existence as part of a coherent, divinely illuminated whole.

Let me return to Grey’s book. In chapter 3, she continues to expand on Milbank’s argument that theology holds a primary and unique position among the sciences. Grey assesses Milbank’s claims by revisiting methodological issues, addressing critical objections, and refining his position, particularly in the context of biology. She emphasizes that theology’s role is not to eradicate other disciplines but to disrupt and “make strange” other discourses, ultimately enhancing their distinctiveness. This disruption is seen as interrogative and judgmental, preserving the integrity of different disciplines while recognizing theology’s overarching narrative. “Milbank’s claim,” she writes, “is that theology has a prerogative on science; or rather, it ‘is alone certainty, alone science’; and that there is no self-contained ‘nature’ demarcatable from supernature.”

Milbank and Grey’s theological positions show similarities to Wolfhart Pannenberg. Unfortunately, there is no explicit acknowledgment of Pannenberg as an influence. This is a shame. Milbank and Grey’s approaches are less focused on engaging with empirical sciences and historical methodologies. Their framework emphasizes a theological critique and transformation of all knowledge, which can sometimes distance theology from the empirical and historical verification processes that are fundamental to the sciences. This can make their theology appear less accessible and defensible in contexts that prioritize empirical evidence and rational discourse.

Pannenberg’s emphasis on the historical nature of revelation and the integration of theology with science and philosophy addresses this gap. He provides a framework where theological claims are subject to historical and rational analysis, making his approach more relevant for interdisciplinary dialogues and for those who value empirical substantiation.

Pannenberg emphasizes the historical nature of revelation, asserting that the truth of Christian claims can be historically verified. He advocates for a theology that integrates insights from science and philosophy, maintaining that theology must engage with all forms of human knowledge. Pannenberg’s approach is marked by a commitment to the idea that theological truths can and should be substantiated through historical and rational analysis.

There are some notable differences between the three, however. In contrast, for example, Milbank challenges the secularization of theology and emphasizes the primacy of theological discourse. He argues for a “theological objectivism” where all knowledge is seen as theological because it participates in divine making. Milbank’s view places theology on the side of postmodern constructivism and relativism by historicizing both grace and nature. He suggests that human making, including knowledge, is a participation in God, thus defending the real through an analogical, participatory manner rather than through a straightforward correspondence theory of truth.

Grey echoes and extends Milbank’s ideas, particularly in how theology should interact with contemporary issues like science and ecology. She argues that theology provides the deepest insights into the nature of reality by incorporating a participatory metaphysics where all creation is seen as participating in the divine. Her approach suggests that theology not only critiques but also enriches other forms of knowledge by integrating them into a theological framework.

Despite these thematic intersections, neither Grey nor Milbank show explicit acknowledgments of Pannenberg as an influence. Instead, they focus on influences from other theologians and philosophers, such as Maurice Blondel for Milbank, who emphasizes the ubiquity of cultural and linguistic mediation, and the nouvelle théologie’s view of nature as always graced.

While Milbank and Grey offer a rich, holistic vision of theology that critiques and transforms secular knowledge, their approaches can be seen as less accessible, less empirically grounded, and more abstract compared to Pannenberg’s framework. Pannenberg’s emphasis on historical verification and rational coherence provides a more structured and verifiable approach, making his theology more practical and accessible, especially in interdisciplinary and empirical contexts. Each approach has its strengths, but the shortcomings of Milbank and Grey highlight the challenges of integrating their rich theological vision with the demands of empirical and rational discourse.

At any rate, in the following chapter, Grey focuses on exploring the relationship between theology and the sciences, particularly through an engagement with Michael Hanby’s work. The chapter sets out to delineate the differences between Milbank’s approach and Hanby’s, ultimately suggesting that Milbank’s narrative hermeneutic can offer a resolution to tensions identified in Hanby’s account. Grey emphasizes that Milbank’s idea of theology’s ‘mastery’ over the sciences is not inherently hostile but seeks to enable differences in their particularities.

Grey critiques in particular Hanby’s defense of a universal objectivity of reason and a genuine autonomy of the sciences. Milbank’s approach, on the other hand, views theology as the sole adequate manager of peaceful differences among disciplines. However, Grey notes that Milbank’s dedication to rescuing theology may neglect the distinct differences of the scientific disciplines, focusing instead on the disruptive difference theology makes. This chapter attempts to show how theological reason can approach sciences like biology without displacing them while maintaining theology’s disruptive difference.

Hanby, mostly known for his provocative book, No God, No Science, provides an extensive response to the relationship between theology and the sciences, particularly biology. He argues that modern science implicitly relies on theological and metaphysical foundations. He critiques the notion that science can be fully autonomous from theology, emphasizing that theological judgments are inherent in scientific practices. He supports the idea of legitima autonomia, where sciences have their own autonomy but remain underpinned by a doctrine of creation that ensures the intelligibility of the created order. Hanby asserts that the division between theology and the sciences is a false dichotomy and that a true understanding of the natural world cannot exclude theological perspectives. He contends that modern biology, for instance, is influenced by hidden (unorthodox) theologies and requires a theological critique to uncover these underlying assumptions. This approach aligns with Milbank’s call for theology to interrogate and illuminate the disciplines, but Hanby provides a Catholic perspective, emphasizing the doctrine of creation as central to this task. Moreover, while Hanby’s position shares similarities with Milbank’s Radical Orthodoxy, he also maintains distinct emphases, particularly in defending the intrinsic rationality and intelligibility of the natural order as a reflection of divine creation.

Grey uses Hanby’s position to contrast and complement Milbank’s views, ultimately seeking to protect the difference of the disciplines without granting them extra-theological status. However, Grey’s argument that Milbank’s conception of theology can enable differences while maintaining a masterful narrative might be seen as overly idealistic. The practical implications of this theological mastery in actual scientific discourse, particularly in contentious fields like biology, remain somewhat abstract. Grey’s reliance on Milbank’s framework might benefit from more concrete examples of how this peaceful difference has been or can be achieved in practice.

In chapter 5, Grey finally arrives at her “theology of biology.” She proposes a “vitalist agenda” for theology. “Knowing life is knowing God, and knowing God is knowing life,” she writes. The chapter recaps the book’s earlier discussions, emphasizing the theological perspective that God’s epiphany impacts everything and that revelation is a deeper visibility of creation’s inherent mediation of the infinite by the finite.

Grey argues that theology has a dual responsibility: to engage with the world’s mediation of God and to interrogate all forms of knowledge through its unique narrative of peace. This dual approach means that theology must engage with organic life as a theological object, embracing the narratives of other disciplines while redeeming any violent or conflictual elements within them.

The chapter suggests two moments in theology’s engagement with scientific knowledge of life. The first moment highlights the discontinuity between modern scientific and Christian understandings of life, making life “strange” when narrated theologically. It involves highlighting the discontinuity between modern scientific and Christian understandings of life. Grey argues that modern scientific views tend to reduce life to mechanistic and material processes, often stripping it of its intrinsic meaning and purpose. By contrast, Christian theology sees life as a reflection of divine creation, imbued with purpose and value beyond mere physical existence.

This moment of discontinuity, moreover, serves to “make life strange” by contrasting the reductionist views of modern science with the rich, purposeful narrative provided by theology. Grey emphasizes that theology should not merely accept scientific accounts at face value but should instead critique and reframe these accounts within a theological context. This reframing process helps to reveal the deeper, often overlooked dimensions of life that are intrinsic to the theological worldview. It challenges the notion that life can be fully explained through scientific mechanisms alone, instead asserting that life’s true nature can only be understood through its relationship to the divine.

The second moment involves recognizing noetic acts (acts of knowing) as conjectural and participating in God’s creative act, thus making scientific knowledge of life inherently theological. Grey posits that all scientific knowledge of life is not merely objective observation but a form of participation in the ongoing act of creation. This perspective aligns with a participatory metaphysics, where human knowledge is seen as a dynamic and active engagement with the divine reality. By viewing scientific inquiry as a participative act, theology can reframe scientific knowledge as an extension of theological insight. This participatory view suggests that scientific discoveries about life are not merely human achievements but also reflections of the divine mind. It places scientific endeavors within a broader theological narrative, asserting that understanding life scientifically is also a way of understanding God’s creative process. This approach encourages a harmonious relationship between theology and science, where both are seen as complementary means of exploring the mysteries of life and creation.

For this section Grey draws on German-born Jewish philosopher Hans Jonas. Jonas is known for his existential and phenomenological approach to biology, which emphasizes the inherent purposefulness and meaningfulness of life. He argues that life cannot be fully understood through reductionist scientific methods that ignore the qualitative, experiential aspects of living organisms. All living organisms, according to Jonas, exhibit a fundamental vitality that cannot be fully explained by physical or chemical processes alone. Grey uses Jonas’s idea that life is irreducible to non-life or death to argue against the reductionist tendencies in modern biology. This vitality points to an inherent purposiveness and self-transcendence in living beings, which Grey interprets as a reflection of divine life. She argues that life, as understood through Jonas’s existential biology, participates in a greater reality that transcends mere physical existence. This participation aligns with her theological perspective that all life is a manifestation of God’s creative act.

While the chapter is intellectually robust and provides a thought-provoking synthesis of theology and biology, it could benefit from more concrete examples to illustrate the practical implications of a theological vitalism. Moreover, Grey’s reliance on Jonas’s philosophical biology, while insightful, may not address all the contemporary issues and debates within the life sciences. A broader engagement with current biological research and its theological implications could strengthen the chapter’s relevance and applicability.

In chapter 6 Grey looks more closely at Jonas’s philosophical biology, with a particular focus on his approach to the living body as central to his inquiry. Grey outlines Jonas’s intellectual genealogy, emphasizing his use of Darwinism and the concept of metabolism to argue against a purely immanent reading of biological facts. Jonas’s philosophical biology is presented as both a critique and a continuation of theological narratives, stressing that without a Christian perspective, life remains conflictual and defined by suffering and death.

Grey highlights several key points in Jonas’s work. First, Jonas’s approach to biology is seen as implicitly theological, challenging Enlightenment models of knowledge by emphasizing desire, temporality, and embodiment. This theological undertone is evident in Jonas’s critique of metaphysical dualism and its monistic offspring, where he uses both negative and positive reasoning to expose inadequacies and demonstrate life’s inherent transcendence. Jonas employs Darwinism to rehabilitate teleology, asserting that metabolism is crucial for understanding the metaphysical implications of living organisms, showing that freedom, inwardness, and purpose are inherent in organic life.

Additionally, Jonas critiques modernity’s dualistic metaphysics, linking it to nihilism and the estrangement between humanity and nature. He argues for a reintegration of human and non-human life, promoting a ‘cosmic piety’ that acknowledges the kinship between all forms of life. Grey presents Jonas’s work as a significant contribution to theological discussions, offering a nuanced understanding of life that bridges philosophical and theological perspectives.

While Grey’s analysis of Jonas is comprehensive and insightful, there are areas where a more critical perspective could be beneficial. Grey’s assertion that Jonas’s work is implicitly theological might be seen as overstating the case. While Jonas does critique Enlightenment rationality and acknowledges the limits of purely scientific explanations, it is debatable whether his work can be fully integrated into a theological framework without some interpretative stretching. Grey notes the methodological differences between Jonas and Milbank, particularly Jonas’s use of dialectics. While she argues that narration should remain the primary framework, this critique may overlook the potential benefits of Jonas’s dialectical approach, which provides a rigorous way to engage with philosophical and biological questions.

In chapter 7 Grey applies Jonas’s philosophical biology to a Christian theological vitalism. Grey sees in Jonas’s philosophical biology a narrative that aligns with Christian theology’s emphasis on the finitude and conflict inherent in life. She proposes a Christian theological vitalism that emphasizes life as a continuous, self-assertive process inherently opposed to secular nihilism. However, Grey also undertakes a prophetic disruption of Jonas’s vitalism, challenging both its method and content from a theological standpoint. This disruption seeks to provide a fuller development of a theological vitalism that goes beyond Jonas’s framework, addressing the ultimate reality and prevalence of death and conflict in the natural world.

One of the key arguments in the chapter is that biological facts should be read as inherently linked to psychic phenomena, suggesting that life itself bears witness against secular reason. This perspective is proposed as a solvent for inadequate ontologies, asserting that life’s intrinsic properties can challenge the reductive explanations offered by secular modernity. By reading biological facts as theological testimonies, Grey attempts to offer a more comprehensive narrative that accounts for the complexities and conflicts of life.

Chapter 7 is significant for its attempt to merge biological insights with theological narratives, suggesting that a comprehensive understanding of life requires both scientific and theological perspectives. This integration aims to provide a deeper narrative that accounts for the complexities and conflicts of life in a way that purely scientific or purely theological accounts might miss. This critical engagement with Jonas’s work proposes an enriched narrative that blends biological and theological insights creatively addresses fundamental questions about life, death, and the natural world.

Before concluding, I want to mention another reviewer’s critique of Grey’s discussion about angels. She discusses the presence and role of angels in relation to the entire cosmos. This idea extends the natural desire for the supernatural and considers the beginning of prevenient grace not only from humans but also from angels, suggesting a cosmological influence. Grey indicates that life is characterized by a “habit,” a term which implies an ontological ultimacy that transcends explanation and is fundamentally expressive of grace. This habit encompasses both the spontaneous and the automatic, suggesting a middle ground that signifies life’s beginningless and inexplicable nature.

Critiques of Grey’s discussion of angels seemingly stem from a secular or naturalistic perspective that questions the real existence or influence of supernatural beings. Such critiques might argue that incorporating angels into theological discourse is an outdated or superfluous concept, irrelevant to modern understandings of the cosmos and human existence. However, from a traditional religious perspective, particularly within orthodox Christianity, this skepticism is problematic for several reasons. Quite simply, angels are extensively mentioned in the Bible, serving as messengers, protectors, and agents of God’s will. Second, in historical Christian belief, angels play a crucial role in the divine order. Denying angels’ existence reduces the richness of the Christian understanding of the spiritual realm. Christianity teaches that the spiritual and material worlds are interconnected, and angels are a vital part of this belief. Removing them diminishes the depth of the spiritual cosmology and the sense of divine mystery.

Carmody Grey’s Theology, Science, and Life is an ambitious and thought-provoking work that seeks to bridge the gap between scientific and theological understandings of life. Grey’s deep engagement with philosophical biology, particularly through the lens of Hans Jonas, allows her to construct a nuanced and robust theological framework that critiques and builds upon existing scientific narratives.

One of the book’s strengths is its interdisciplinary approach. Grey does not shy away from complex scientific concepts, instead embracing them to enrich her theological arguments. Her thorough examination of Jonas’s vitalism and its implications for understanding life, freedom, and purpose provides a solid foundation for her own theological propositions. By intertwining biological facts with theological narratives, Grey offers a fresh perspective that challenges reductive explanations and highlights the inherent transcendence and purposiveness of life.

However, the book is not without its challenges. Grey’s dense and highly intellectual writing style may be difficult for some readers to engage with fully. The depth of her analysis and the breadth of her references require careful and attentive reading. Additionally, while Grey’s arguments are compelling, some readers may find her theological assertions to be somewhat interpretative, especially when integrating Jonas’s philosophical biology into a Christian framework.

Nevertheless, this book is essential reading for those interested in the intersections of these fields and for anyone seeking to explore the deeper implications of life and its metaphysical dimensions.